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NOTICE 
Asymmetry, Fairness, & Criminal Trials 
Stephen E. Hessler* 
THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD: IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? By H. 
Richard Uviller. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1999. Pp. ix, 314. 
$30. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rules of criminal procedure, like all rules of legal procedure, exist 
to advance the goals of the corresponding substantive law.1 To ask 
whether American criminal justice - pursued through the operation 
of these procedural rules - is fair is to engage in a debate that has 
persisted since the Founding.2 More recently, the early twentieth cen­
tury witnessed a revolution against the procedural formalism of pre­
ceding decades.3 Whether justified or not, the perception flourished 
* Many thank.s to.Professors Richard D. Friedman and Joan A. Larsen. 
1. See Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 
723, 725 (1942) ("The substantive criminal law determines the kind of questions we must 
ask; rational procedure, embodying legal principles, prescribes what steps we must take and 
how we shall take them to secure the necessary answers."); Roscoe Pound, The Canons of 
Procedural Reform, 12 AB.A. J. 541, 543 (1926) ("Legal procedure is a means, not an end; it 
must be made subsidiary to the substantive law as a means of making that law effective in 
action.") . .  
2. At least one Framer identified the birth of the American Revolution in the colonists' 
resistance to English customs officers' indiscriminate use of writs of assistance to enter 
buildings to search for and seize smuggled goods: 
In 1761, James Otis, Jr., representing 68 Boston merchants, opposed in court the issuance of 
new writs. He did not prevail, but this does not detract from the impact of Otis' oratory. As 
John Adams, a youthful spectator, was later to recall: " [H]e was a flame of fire!" * * * Every 
man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against 
writs of assistance. * * * Then and there the Child of Independence was born. In fifteen 
years, namely in 1776, he grew up to manhood, and declared himself free. 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
l.l(a), at 4 (3rd ed. 1996) (quoting 10 c. ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 
247-48 (1856)) (alterations in original). 
3. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in 
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1 198 (1960) ("The 'procedural revolution' of the 
twentieth century followed inevitably from the legal realists' attack upon the procedural 
formalism of the prior century."). 
1560 
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that the legal system's dogmatic adherence to process4 allowed many 
criminals to escape punishment, and endangered society. The public 
statements of the era's most prominent jurists were marked by a 
common theme: the rules of criminal procedure were unjustifiably 
skewed in favor of the defendant. 
This conventional wisdom was most farµously advanced by Judge 
Learned Hand, who in 1923 wrote: 
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While 
the prosecution is held rigidly to' the charge, he need not disclose the 
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment 
on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is at least fair doubt in 
the minds of any one of the twelve . . . .  Our dangers do not lie in too little 
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been haunted by 
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we 
need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that ob­
structs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.5 
Soon after, Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo wrote his legen­
dary criticism of the exclusionary rule, decrying as absurd that "[t]he 
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."6 A former 
president of the American Bar Association complained "society is too 
ready to intervene in behalf of the guilty, to sh.ield him by unwritten 
law, or by sentimental nonsense to prevent adequate punishment."7 
Furthermore, this harsh rhetoric was by no means limited to the 
leading lights of the bench and bar, as members of the academy like­
wise issued alarmist warnings. According to Robert Millar of 
Northwestern University Law School, "[m]ost of the faults of the ex-
4. See Rollin M. Perkins, Absurdities in Criminal Procedure, 11 IOWA L. REV. 297, 324-
25 (1926) ("We have been so deeply engrossed for so long a period of time in the effort to 
see that all of the rules of the game are duly observed under our 'sporting theory of justice,' 
that we have to an alarming degree lost sight of the real purpose of the investigation, which 
should be to determine whether the defendant is innocent or guilty."). See generally Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. 
REV. 729 (1906). 
5. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Judge Hand's position has 
been described as "perhaps the most frequently quoted statement opposing liberal defense 
discovery." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 20.l(b), at 819 (2nd ed. 1999). 
6. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). Professor Yale Kamisar has charac­
terized Judge's Cardozo's words as "the most famous criticism·of the [exclusionary] rule and 
surely the best one-sentence argument ever made against it." Yale Kamisar, The Warren 
Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 39 (1995). 
7. Moorfield Storey, Some Practical Suggestions for the Reform of Criminal Procedure, 4 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 495, 501 (1913). At one time "[i]t may have been neces­
sary . . .  to protect the innocent, but to-day the innocent are in no appreciable danger. Soci­
ety watches with too much care the proceedings of courts, the press is always on the lookout 
for a sensation, and any abuse of a witness is too promptly condemned to leave an innocent 
man in any danger of being browbeaten into an admission of guilt, or being convicted by a 
perversion of his answers." 
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isting system inure to the benefit of the defendant."8 As a result, said 
University of Michigan Law School Professor Edson Sunderland, 
"[t]he criminal defendant is given so much protection that victims of 
crime - those of us who are law-abiding and rely upon the state's as­
surance of protection, get almost none at all."9 Echoing his colleagues, 
Charles Kellogg Burdick, Dean of Cornell University Law School, 
cautioned that "[a]t present time our danger is not that under the 
guise of criminal prosecution a tyrannical government will threaten 
the lives and liberties of its citizens, but that government will be a 
made a laughing stock by the increasing numbers of criminals who 
prey upon society and go unpunished."10 
Today, alliances in the criminal procedure debate have shifted, as 
legal academics are generally more prone to believe that the accused 
are disadvantaged. The Warren Court may have incorporated nearly 
all of the criminal provisions in the Bill of Rights against the States,11 
significantly expanding defendants' protections under the Fourth,1 2  
Fifth,1 3 Sixth,1 4 and Eighth Amendments,15 but contemporary scholars 
see ample cause for concern. Stated broadly, the "rights revolution" of 
the 1960s was followed by a movement in the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts away from a criminal justice model focused on due process to 
one concerned primarily with crime control.16 Coupled with omnipres­
ent fears that America faces a "crime crisis," there is little popular sen­
timent for reforming the rules of criminal procedure in favor of defen-
8. Robert W. Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 344, 366 (1920). 
9. Edson R. Sunderland, Cooperation Between the Bar and the Public in Improving the 
Administration of Justice, 1 ALA. L.J. 5 (1925). 
10. Charles Kellogg Burdick, Criminal Justice in America: Possibility of Improvement by 
Statutory Changes and Constitutional Amendments Affecting Procedure, 11 A.B.A. J. 510, 
515 (1925). 
11. See generally CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
REVOLUTION 18-34 (1993). 
12 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure). 
13. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination). 
14. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy 
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confront witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel). 
15. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment). 
16. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 PITI. L. REV. 393 (1992); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law Enforce­
ment, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11 ,  32 (1988) ("It is simply tragic that all of the Supreme Court's 
recent energies have been directed to the search for new ways to escape the thrust of the 
Warren Court innovations. We need to be moving in precisely the opposite direction . . . .  
The future of individual liberties in this country depends on reinvigorating the system of vig­
orous checks and balances built into our Bill of Rights."). 
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dants.17 In other words, modern criminal defendants enjoy far greater 
rights than their forebears, but legal academics are generally con­
vinced that our system is unfairly imbalanced against the accused.1 8 
In his book The Tilted Playing Field: Is Criminal Justice Unfair?, 
Professor H. Richard Uviller1 9 displays an independence among his 
colleagues by answering the question of his subtitle in the negative -
although his is a rather tentative no: 
[A ]11 in all, when day is done, I must say it seems to me that the Ameri­
can system for the delivery of criminal justice, while tilted in many re­
spects, is not out of balance in that, in the main, it embodies a fair distri­
bution of license and limits to the parties, 1}n allocation that closely 
corresponds to their differing functions. It is, in other words, tolerably 
fair. [p. 307] 
As the multiple qualifiers of his conclusion indicate, Uviller's book is 
neither a ringing endorsement nor a damning critique of the American 
criminal justice system. Uviller does not deny that multiple disparities 
may be found in the respective positions of prosecutor and defendant 
in a criminal trial. But he rejects as an "unfortunate metaphorical 
transposition" the contention that the playing field must be level to be 
fair, instead arguing that examples of unequal distribution of power 
between adversaries are often "not only tolerable, but valued compo­
nents of a fair system of adjudication."20 In other words, rather than 
condemn the tilted playing field as unfair, Uviller recognizes the dis­
parate allocation of advantages as crucial to protecting the integrity of 
the process. 
17. "According to the media, the claims of law enforcement officials and the statements 
of politicians, we have always been experiencing a 'crime crisis' - at no time in our recent, 
or not-so-recent, past has there been a time when 'society' could afford a strengthening or 
expansion of the rights of the accused." Kamisar, supra . note 6, at 46; see also Yale Kamisar, 
When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7. 1965, reprinted in CRIME AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54 (Donald R. Cresey ed. 1971) (demonstrating that successive genera­
tions have always claimed to be in the midst of a "crime crisis"). 
18. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in 
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 792 (1970) ("To a mind-staggering extent . . .  the 
entire system of criminal justice below the level of the Supreme Court of the United States is 
solidly massed against the criminal suspect."); Gershman, supra note 16, at 394 (arguing that 
a "vast accretion of prosecutorial power . . .  has resulted in a radical skewing of the balance 
of advantage in the criminal justice system in favor of the state"). But see Christopher A. 
Bracey, Truth and Legitimacy in the American Criminal Process, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 691 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999) 
(noting "[a] new perspective on the criminal process, premised on the belief that the social 
and political conditions that necessitated liberal reform of the criminal process ·no longer 
exist, or that the normative structure that protects these reformist measures from erosion has 
been drained of its vitality, is quickly gaining currency in . . .  the theoretical halls of aca­
deme"). 
19. Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia Law School., 
20. Pp. 6, 18. Uviller cites the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof as 
prominent examples of valuable disparities. 
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Although the confrontational setting of the courtroom naturally 
promotes the metaphor of criminal trials as sporting events, Uviller 
argues the comparison is inapt. Fairness in a sporting contest, after all, 
requires opponents who are evenly matched. Fairness in a criminal 
trial, on the other hand, should not be understood to mandate literal 
parity of resources and prerogative among parties. Rather, Uviller as­
serts, "what we must mean is balanced empowerment," or a commit­
ment to assigning privileges to the prosecution and defense on the ba­
sis of their dissimilar roles in the criminal trial (p. 16). Whether the 
respective entitlements promote or inhibit fairness depends on the 
"rationality of the connection between the supposed advantage and 
the principle it serves" (p. 19). 
Thus, Uviller writes, it is "inescapable" that fairness is related to 
function (p. 19). And this premise, once accepted, forms the logical 
basis for Uviller's arguments. Unlike two parties to a civil proceeding, 
prosecutor and defender have little in common. Accordingly, "it 
should be obvious that to talk about a 'balance of advantage' as 
though it were a simple comparison of armament, without taking ac­
count of the differing functions of the parties, is foolish" (p. 21). The 
prosecutor is a government agent representing the public, possessed 
with the duty to assess evidence of criminal activity unearthed by in­
vestigation, the discretion to initiate charges where appropriate, and 
the obligation to prove these facts at trial. Defense counsel, on the 
other hand, is a private advocate for an individual client, responsible 
only for discrediting the prosecution's presentation of the case. There­
fore, "[t]he best way to assess fairness in these circumstances is 
to . . .  consider the implements accorded by law for the accomplish­
ment of these differing objectives" (p. 21). A disadvantage is unfair if 
it is a "disabling impediment inappropriate to the task of the party suf­
fering it" (p. 21). 
With this distinction - that prosecutor and defender differ in both 
role and objective - in mind, Uviller sets out to examine several areas 
of comparative disadvantage, and to measure disparities "to determine 
their congruence with a communal sense of fairness in public law" (p. 
6). In performing this task, Uviller writes, it would be far easier to 
"flee to the illusory safety" of "process-enhancing alternative[ s ],'' i.e., 
to promote fairness by "maintaining a smooth and level playing field 
with no concern for the outcome of the games played upon it" (p. 31). 
This would, however, avoid hard questions of substantive fairness, 
questions which Uviller has no intention of ducking. 
That said, the ultimate impact of Uviller's project may be seen as 
somewhat modest. Because his intent is more informative than pre­
scriptive, Uviller has not offered a blueprint for systemic reform. 
Rather, he has developed a model for gauging fairness in an area of 
law perceived to be manifestly unfair. To the extent that Uviller de­
bunks reflexive notions that justice requires a level playing field, his 
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efforts are undeniably valuable. But the inherent subjectivity of 
Uviller's analytical method limits its utility, and in the end, any conclu­
sions about the fairness of the criminal justice system will turn on the 
values of the individual asking the hard questions. 
Uviller, to his credit, makes no attempt to gloss over this feature of 
his inquiry. When ascertaining which tenets of fairness are fundamen­
tal, "[s]omebody's preferences are going to have a big part in drawing 
up that list of the essential basics" (p. 18). Although controversial, re­
lying on personal biases is an unavoidable element of Uviller's task. "I 
have no choice. I am ill-equipped to propose any set of incontroverti­
ble first principles and then to develop a just criminal system from 
them" (pp. 21-22). Unlike other "intrepid jurisprudents [who] have 
made attempts at such grand schemes," 21 Uviller is "not optimistic that 
a unified, value-free field theory will emerge" (p. · 22). Thus, "to talk 
about the subject of fairness at all, I must risk the distortion of per­
sonal perspective" (p. 22). 
The product of Uviller's efforts is a provocative and engaging 
book. Uviller's pro-prosecutorial leanings (he spent fourteen years as 
a District Attorney in New York County earlier in his career22) occa­
sionally emerge, but he forthrightly acknowledges them and avoids 
any appearance of pursuing a hidden ideological agenda.23 Indeed, it 
would be difficult to characterize his views as politically liberal or con­
servative. 24 Rather, Uviller is largely a pragmatist, committed to a 
21. Uviller's list of those who found themselves well-equipped to propose a set of incon­
trovertible first principles is not short. "Bless them, the postmodern utilitarians, the secular 
theists, post-Marxist republicans, the gender-role feminists, the neorealist critical theorists, 
and the rest." P. 22. 
22 See http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/huviller.html (last visited May 1, 2001). 
23. For example, in Chapter 4 Uviller discusses the so-called "White-Hat Factor," or the 
theory that the overt presumption of innocence enjoyed .by defendants is undermined by ju­
ries that are predisposed to identify with crime victims, and to assume that the prosecutor 
would not have brought charges unless the defendant is probably guilty. Uviller unrepen­
tantly writes that: 
I know that when I was trying cases for the prosecutor, I relied heavily on the white hat fac­
tor to which I thought myself entitled . . . .  Before the jury I would contrive in a dozen small 
gestures and inflections to reinforce what I assumed to be the inclination of my twelve stal­
warts to favor truth and decency over brutality, deceit, and self-interest. I cannot imagine 
any prosecutor worthy of carrying the public pennant who would do otherwise. 
Pp. 113-14. 
Nevertheless, Uviller goes on to note that while the vast majority of prosecutors are 
honorable, there inevitably are those who are "unworthy servants." Therefore, 
"[g]overnment claims on the white hat are precarious. Where one can conscientiously doubt 
the attribution of goodwill, the entitlement collapses - as it should." P. 139. 
24. The use of such labels may be problematic, but a few conventional definitions are 
possible. "The liberal perspective recognizes the necessity of enforcing the criminal law," but 
"qualifies that necessity by affirming the values of individual autonomy and equality among 
persons, values that frequently compete with law enforcement." Donald A. Dripps, Beyond 
the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 591-92 (1990). On the other side, the 
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functional design of the criminal justice system, but also prone to oc­
casional bursts of idealism.25 Uviller's prose, save a few distracting 
idiosyncrasies,26 is logical and clear. He is unafraid to speak forcefully 
and honestly, often making claims that seem designed to invite harsh 
criticism, such as his repeated statements that most criminal defen­
dants are guilty,27 and his admitted inability to identify with defense 
counsel.28 Whether readers agree or disagree with Uviller, they are 
unlikely to find him boring. 
The most notable feature of Uviller's work is how his examination 
of the asymmetrical nature of the American criminal justice system re­
sults in a book that is both restrained and daring. This Notice will 
demonstrate that although Uviller is largely inclined to defend the 
status quo, he also advocates proposals that would require a sweeping 
reconceptualization of a significant portion of modern constitutional 
criminal procedure. Part I shows how Uviller is, for the most part, a 
pragmatist, persuaded that fairness in criminal adjudication does not 
mandate equality among the parties. Part II explains how Uviller's 
more ambitious proposals, involving profound modification of the ex­
clusionary rules, offer at best only uncertain advantages over current 
doctrine. This Notice will conclude that the Uviller's inquiry (subjec­
tive as it may be) is a useful contribution to the ongoing debate about 
fairness in criminal trials. 
conservative "perspective's fundamental premise is that rational criminal procedure should 
have the primary object of determining the truth of a criminal charge," and thus "oppose 
freeing the guilty as a remedy for government violations of autonomy or equality." Id. at 
592·93. 
25. "Even those of us who reject the criminal process as a vehicle for fighting social 
wrongs, even those of us who believe that the Constitution is not offended by the conviction 
of a guilty person because he is poor, talkative; and not too shrewd concerning his own best 
interests, we find we must explore the purposes of the functions that we would like to con· 
sider essentially neutral." Pp. 17·18; see also Robert Weisberg, (Almost) The Best of All 
Worlds of Criminal Law, 2 BOOKS·ON·LAW 8, 'll 1 (Oct. 1999), at http://www.jurist.law. 
pitt.edu/lawbooks/revoct99.htm#Weisberg (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED 
PLAYING FIELD: Is CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? (1999) (noting that Uviller "switches tone 
from disappointed idealist to wizened pragmatist"). 
26. Most disconcerting is Uviller's periodic lapses into an odd informal tone: "[W]ith all 
respect to the ghost of Justice Thurgood Marshall, discovery is not a two·way street. Sorry, 
Thurgood, it just does not run in this direction." P. 106. "[F]reed of the confines and group 
pressure that finally overcame his better judgment, the former juror may find himself look· 
ing for a way to scuttle the verdict of his peers, or at least have the last word. What better 
way than Uviller's Dandy Impeachment Gambit (acronym pronounced You Dig)?" P. 272. 
27. "In those relatively rare instances in which the client is truly innocent" (p. 20); 
"nearly all defendants are in fact guilty" (p. 1 19); "not all criminal defendants are guilty, but 
most are" (p. 138). 
28. See infra Section I.C. 
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I. PRAGMATIST: MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
The central theme of Uviller's book - that absolute parity be­
tween prosecution and defendant is neither a necessary nor warranted 
feature of a criminal trial - is not particularly radical. 29 In fact, 
Uviller's belief that "symmetry is only the dullest form of balance and 
inappropriate when roles differ sharply," should not instinctively be 
understood as a threat to the rights of criminal defendants (p. 106). 
Indeed, Uviller's thesis finds support in the words of no less a civil lib­
ertarian than Justice William Brennan: "[r]ules of fairness in a crimi­
nal trial must derive not from some effort evenly to match the sides -
the government and the accused - but from careful attention to the 
trial's internal truth-finding function."30 
What does appear unique about Uviller's project is his application 
of the asymmetry lens to every stage of the criminal justice process, 
from investigation to appeal.31 Most often he advocates only minor 
adjustments to existing procedure, but occasionally urges major revi­
sion. This Part looks at four of the criminal procedure issues discussed 
by Uviller: prosecutorial discretion, discovery, ethical license, and bail. 
For different reasons, in each of these areas Uviller demonstrates a 
commitment to the status quo, concluding reform is either unneces­
sary or unlikely. 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Uviller's project begins with prosecutorial discretion to initiate 
charges. Although this power is exclusive and largely unreviewable, 
Uviller maintains that the one-sided advantage is unfair only if two 
conditions are met: first, evidence must be presented of actual, not po­
tential, abuse; and second, there must be some demonstration that 
sharing the charging authority is feasible. Addressing this latter point, 
Uviller logically demonstrates why it would be unwise for this official 
discretion to be extended to private parties. Permitting defense-
29. Cf Richard D. Friedman, An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Perempto­
ries?, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1992); Richard D. Friedman, Comment, Character Impeach­
ment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 816 (1994). Nor does Uviller claim original ownership of the proposition, noting that 
"(t]he more sophisticated among scholars dismiss the idea that justice requires an equal dis­
tribution of power between adversaries, preferring to consider the success of our criminal 
justice system either in terms of the truth of the verdicts produced, sensitivity to abuse of 
authority, or civic approval ratings. And we will, of course, take this enlightened path." Pp. 
5-6. 
30. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 ,  18 (1990). 
31 .  Uviller does not examine these steps in chronological order, but in a summary chap­
ter at the close of his book he does put the pieces together, and offers a step-by-vision of the 
"just prosecution." Pp. 281-304. 
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initiated prosecution is obviously unworkable. A stronger argument 
can made that victims of crime should be allowed to instigate charges, 
but their remaining options of civil redress, as well as the notion that 
prosecutors seek to bring criminal accusations to vindicate the inter­
ests of all of society, not just victims, is enough for Uviller to conclude 
it is fair that prosecutorial authority remain solely in the hands of gov­
ernment officials (pp. 42-44). 
This is not to say that Uviller disavows all checks as unnecessary; 
the presence of grand juries and preliminary hearings, for instance, 
perform important screening functions. But to the extent any external 
guidance is warranted, the articulation of standards, similar to those 
promulgated by the Department of Justice for U.S. Attorneys' offices, 
would help internally focus enforcement priorities and reinforce 
prosecutorial values. Uviller cautions, however, that such standards 
would have to remain confidential, lest they assume the status of a 
mere public relations ploy, or create enforceable rights.32 
Ultimately, "[t]he best protection against facile or biased accusa­
tion is the prospect of trial, and the embarrassment potential of the 
unwinnable case" (p. 64). Although this "advantage" inures solely to 
the benefit of the government, widespread reform is unnecessary be­
cause, "with pockets of dissent here and there, I think most people 
approve of the prosecutorial choices being made - as do I" (p. 67). 
Regarding Uviller's first consideration, his demand for hard proof 
of actual abuse seems reasonable enough, but the Court's 1996 deci­
sion United States v. Armstrong33 made the requirements for a defen­
dant to obtain discovery so strict as to render the success of a selective 
prosecution claim practically impossible.34 Uviller notes that "selective 
prosecution is a long-shot defense, a very long shot," but he is untrou­
bled, as he does not want "courtrooms tied up with the contentious 
pursuit of imponderable questions," preferring instead that abuses be 
corrected with political and administrative remedies (pp. 52-53). 
32. P. 68. Courts have thus far been reluctant to do so. See, e.g., Nichols v. Reno, 931 
F.Supp. 748 (D.Colo. 1996), aff d 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the United 
States Attorneys' Manual does not provide any judicially enforceable rights to Oklahoma 
City bombing defendant Terry Nichols where Attorney General Janet Reno stated at a press 
conference three days before any suspects had been apprehended that the death penalty 
would be sought, although the Manual set forth a detailed process to be followed before 
making an ultimate determination). 
33. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
34. The Armstrong Court held that "[t)he claimant must demonstrate that the federal 
prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discrimina­
tory purpose.' " Id. at 465. In other words, " [t)o establish a discriminatory effect in a race 
case, the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not 
prosecuted." Id. In addition, the Court held that FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, which governs discov­
ery in criminal cases, "authorizes defendants to examine Government documents material to 
the preparation of their defense against the Government's case in chief, but not to the 
preparation of selective prosecution claims." Id. at 463. 
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Uviller's claim, when considered alone, certainly is not indefensi­
ble. The problem, however, is that selective prosecution claims are 
brought most often in the context of suits alleging racial discrimina­
tion35 (as was the case in Armstrong), a topic Uviller conspicuously 
omits from his book. At the outset Uviller acknowledges, "I do not, in 
these pages, examine the impact of race on fairness" (p. 25). Why? "I 
know little about it. I cannot answer the most troublesome questions 
with any confidence" (p. 25). While Uviller can at least be credited for 
including his "apologetic disclaimer" (p. 24), as opposed to engaging 
the topic only superficially, much of what follows inevitably provokes 
important questions that remain unanswered. "If racial bias permeates 
the system and the way we think about it, I have necessarily put it on 
hold as I discuss other sources of unfairness" (p. 25). It seems plausi­
ble to assert, however, that racial bias cannot be , cleanly extricated 
from "other sources of unfairness," and thus it may be futile to exam­
ine the latter independently of the former.36 In any event, the absence 
of any extended substantive discussion on this point is glaring, and un­
dermines some of Uviller's comments in this and subsequent contexts 
as rather glib. 37 
B. Discovery 
Advocates for greater parity between prosecution and defense of­
fer their arguments in the belief that a balance of entitlements will re­
sult in criminal trials more fair to defendants generally, and guard 
against the conviction of innocent persons specifically., In other words, 
given the government's information-gathering advantages, (e.g., the 
power to subpoena evidence, grant immunity to witnesses, etc.) ,  a 
commitment to symmetry requires the state to share fully the fruits of 
35. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discre­
tion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) ("Courts have consistently upheld and sanctioned 
prosecutorial discretion, and make it increasingly difficult to mount legal challenges to dis­
cretionary decisions that have a discriminatory effect on African American criminal defen­
dants and crime victims. These challenges are usually brought as selective prosecution 
claims . . . .  ") . 
36. Cf Kamisar, supra note 6, at 6 ("As the late A. Kenneth Pye observed in the closing 
years of the Warren Court era, ' [t]he Court's concern with criminal procedure can be under­
stood only in the context of the struggle for civil rights.' ") (quoting A. Kenneth Pye, The 
Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968) (emphasis added)). 
37. A few examples of the "imponderable questions" Uviller does not want courtrooms 
"tied up with" include: 
Was this, the third consecutive prosecution of a Sicilian for mob-related racketeering, the 
manifestation of an impermissible ethnic bias on the part of some federal prosecutor? Does 
some government drug buster harbor a private conviction that Latinos of Central America 
are the major exporters of cocaine to the United States? And does that belief result in exces­
sive concentration of prosecution energy on Spanish-speaking people? Did a Los Angeles 
detective express hostility to African Americans in unrelated circumstances? 
Pp. 52-53. 
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its investigative labors. As Uviller demonstrates, however, the oppo­
site may in fact be true, that leveling the playing field may, in some re­
spects, actually undermine the position of the accused. 
In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Florida statute that re­
quired a defendant to provide the prosecution, in advance of trial, no­
tice of any alibi he intended to introduce.38 In exchange, the state was 
required to disclose to the defendant a list of any witnesses it planned 
to offer to attack the alibi. Three years later the Court voided an 
Oregon notice of alibi rule that mandated similar disclosure require­
ments of the defendant, but imposed no corresponding duties on the 
prosecution.3 9 "[D]iscovery must be a two-way street," wrote Justice 
Marshall, holding that unilateral defense disclosure was fundamentally 
unfair.40 
But, as Uviller points out, in reality discovery is not (and should 
not be) a two-way street, and any imbalance must favor the accused. 
"It may be that where the defense must disclose, the prosecution must 
do likewise; but it is not the case that where the prosecution must dis­
close, the defense must reciprocate" (p. 106). Moreover, those who 
would fashion rules of discovery to effect equivalent obligations fail to 
anticipate the ultimate consequences of reform. According to Uviller, 
"[t]he idea that full mutual discovery, or even augmented discovery, 
offers a significant shield for the innocent is not readily apparent" (pp. 
110-11). The truly innocent accused has little to gain by learning the 
prosecution's case ahead of trial. "Unlike his culpable counte"rpart, 
who has little hope beyond discrediting prosecution evidence, the in­
nocent defendant is probably busy assembling an independent sce­
nario proving his innocence. And revealing his case in advance to the 
prosecutor is just asking for trouble" (p. 111). At least in this context, 
asymmetry operates to promote fairness. 
C. Ethical License 
Uviller finds similar pro-defendant disparity in the "tolerable de­
ceptions" permitted defense counsel, but not the prosecution (p. 236). 
The unequal entitlements are multiple: a prosecutor may not charge a 
defendant she believes is innocent, ask a jury to believe a witness that 
she believes is lying, nor impeach a witness she believes is telling the 
truth. Defense counsel, on the other hand, "suffers no such con­
straints" (p. 238). Whatever their personal beliefs, "[t]hey owe an 
equally vigorous defense to the defendant they believe is guilty and 
38. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
39. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
40. 412 U.S. at 475. 
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the one they think is totally innocent."41 In the context of comparative 
disadvantage, the "sharply different license to distort puts a rhetorical 
weapon of major caliber in the hands of the defense only" (p. 242). 
As to whether this is unfair, Uviller uncharacteristically equivo­
cates. "No, to the extent that the license to distort is founded on pre­
rogatives themselves supportable by important social values, it is fair. 
Yes, insofar as the supposed basis is rotten, or the license exceeds the 
dictates of the underlying values, it is unfair" (p. 242). For Uviller, dis­
cerning these values requires contrasting the functions of the partici­
pants. The prosecution is the party appropriately charged with the di­
rective to uncover and present the truth. Defense counsel's role in our 
adversarial criminal justice system is to steadfastly challenge govern­
ment efforts to impair the liberty of its citizens. "While the govern­
ment's pursuit of a verdict reflecting the historic truth is a virtuous un­
dertaking, it is also fraught with dangers of arrogance and oppression, 
to say nothing of error" (p. 242). 
While Uviller could not bring himself to defend the guilty, he is 
thankful that others are willing to do so.42 After all, "this specially 
commissioned challenger, this amoral privateer, serves a wholesome 
public purpose. And a certain amount of deception may well be within 
that useful ambit of tolerance" (p. 243). In sum, the dissimilar ethical 
imperatives of prosecutor and defender present for Uviller a "logical 
anomaly," but one that must be grudgingly accepted to ensure the fair 
treatment of the accused (p. 253). 
D. Bail 
Despite his general belief that the tilted playing field does not dis­
advantage criminal defendants, Uviller recognizes that pockets of in­
justice do exist. When it comes to the subject of bail, Uviller is ada­
mant that the system is plagued by unfairness. Although, as with race, 
Uviller generally avoids contentious issues about the effects of wealth 
Id. 
41. Pp. 238-39. 
Whether (defense] counsel chooses to arrive at a conclusion on issues that will be submitted 
to the jury is a matter of personal style. Some lawyers probably become convinced by their 
own efforts, and fight with a sense of personal conviction. Others doubtless maintain an atti­
tude of general skepticism, committing themselves to no one's story. But whatever their in­
clination, whatever belief they may have achieved or succumbed to, the lawyer's perform­
ance and the ethical obligations behind it are unaffected. 
42. "Frankly, I don't know how they do it. I don't think that I could dedicate my profes­
sional life to the pursuit of undeserved breaks for the undeserving. It's hard to imagine tak­
ing pride in those cases when my efforts frustrated the demands of justice. Maybe they have 
a different notion of justice. But however they do it, I'm glad they are there, energetically, 
year in and year out, fighting for a contrary interpretation." P. 243. 
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on fairness,43 in this context he writes "even I must concede that there 
is one aspect of our criminal justice system where financial disparities 
are manifest and deeply troublesome" (p. 166). The problem, as 
Uviller sees it, is that "[t]he decision about bail is casual, impulsive, 
largely idiosyncratic, totally arbitrary, wildly variable, and without any 
possibility of objective verification" (p. 166). Uviller believes there are 
two reasons why most defendants are detained before trial, unable to 
participate fully in preparing their own defense. "Either the judge has 
intentionally set terms for their preconviction release that are beyond 
[the defendant's] reach, or they are simply unable to come up with the 
monetary security that others ordinarily manage" (p. 169). 
Uviller's solution would be to have judges first make a decision -
irrespective of wealth, considering only other, nonfiscal factors af­
fecting the likelihood of flight - as to whether the defendant should 
remain incarcerated while awaiting trial. If the answer is yes, bail is 
denied outright, rather than set prohibitively high, and subject to ex­
pedited appellate review. If the answer is no, conditional release is 
granted, and monetary bail (if necessary) is set at a level .the defendant 
can realistically manage. Uviller sees the benefit of "radical" reform to 
be that "[f]ocusing on the question 'Is there any good reason why this 
person should await judgment on the inside?' turns judges from their 
traditional concern: just how much money is likely to deter disappear­
ance" (p. 183). And liberty determinations based on factors such as 
preventing flight or preserving public safety, rather than based on 
wealth, are more consonant with the inherent purposes of pretrial de­
tention. 
Uviller is quick to recognize the weaknesses of his proposal. First, 
his approach does not entirely remove judges from the "tea leaf­
reading game," it merely redirects their predictive focus. And second, 
similar reform at the federal level has resulted in even more prisoners 
being detained by cursory and routine procedures (pp. 184-86). Most 
significantly, Uviller acknowledges that "tough on crime" politicians 
43. Uviller writes that economic disparities between rich and poor accused involve ques­
tions of equal protection only between defendants themselves, and these issues are therefore 
beyond the scope of a book that addresses the imbalance between prosecution and defense. 
P. 162. That said, however, he also declares to be unpersuaded by claims that "only the fi­
nancially fortunate have the resources to match and meet the legions of the government. 
And thus, in this scheme, while the playing field may be more or less level between the 
prosecutor and some few rich defendants, for the many poor it is woefully out of kilter, 
forcing them to play against the government at an irreparable disadvantage." Pp. 162-63. 
Even assuming a financial disparity between government and accused does exist (Uviller 
is unconvinced), it is not unfair. Rather, the real imbalance comes in the form of lawyering 
skills, and this cuts both ways. Uviller's theory, in a nutshell, is that many prosecutors are 
young and inexperienced, and many defenders (themselves former prosecutors) are sea­
soned veterans. Pp. 163-64. Furthermore, on the basis of evidence both empirical and anec­
dotal Uviller is "not even so sure that, as between defendants, the one who can afford to re­
tain private counsel will come out better than the one who, by reason of indigence, must 
accept assigned counsel." P. 165. 
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would likely circumscribe the increased judicial discretion required by 
his plan once the media inevitably sensationalized the release of de­
fendants on bail (p. 187). 
Ever the pragmatist, Uviller "harbor[s] some hope that function 
will follow form, that with a superior design in place, the operation of 
the system may come in time, and to some extent, conform" (p. 188). 
Still, this provides little solace to Uviller the idealist, who "know[s] 
that, especially in the explosive capsule of the process we call bail, the 
struggle persists between good intentions and enlightened prescrip­
tions on one side and, on the other, the practical realities of court­
rooms and legislative chambers. And as we watch that familiar specta­
cle, optimism does not flourish" (p. 188). In other words, when it 
comes to bail, Uviller cannot defend the status quo, but he is resigned 
to the reality that reform is not likely to be forthcoming. 
II. REFORMER: REVISING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULES 
Although Uviller's book is largely a defense of the status quo, the 
major reforms that he does advocate would require reconceptualizing 
a considerable amount of constitutional criminal procedure. Most sig­
nificantly, he is not, to say the least, a proponent of the exclusionary 
rules. "In the empirical wilderness, not knowing what effect judicial 
response to police illegality has on other cops in other, different, and 
future situations, I am dubious about the underlying premises of the 
exclusionary rules" (p. 195). Uviller's skepticism, however, does not 
prevent him from concluding that "[t)he program of automatic exclu­
sion, it seems to me, has largely done its job" (p. 197). Today, "[t)he 
marginal deterrence we can expect from excluding evidence is now, I 
believe, greatly exceeded by the social cost of depriving fact finders of 
relevant and probative data on which to make the difficult determina­
tion of guilt" (p. 197).  
Although Uviller's focus on the deterrence rationale mirrors the 
recent approach of the Court,44 many would argue that justifying the 
exclusionary rules in cost-benefit terms inappropriately requires de­
fending the doctrine's efficacy, not whether it is constitutionally com­
pelled.45 This does not mean Uviller is unwilling to concede that values 
other than deterrence of police misconduct are served by the exclu­
sionary rules; protecting the "dignitary interest" of the judiciary com­
mands that "courts must remain alert to and fundamentally intolerant 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) ("No empirical researcher, 
proponent, or opponent of the [exclusionary] rule has yet been able to establish with any 
assurance that the rule has a deterrent effect.") (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
452 n.22 (1976) ). 
45. See generally Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A 
"Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition "?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 
(1983). 
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of any incursion on the precious - and precarious - liberties of the 
citizens" (p. 197). 
But, that said, Uviller is eager to "start from scratch and construct 
a fair system that most closely serv[es] the best of the competing val­
ues now crudely approximated by the jerry-built catacomb we call the 
exclusionary rules" (p. 198). Uviller conceives of his project as a 
thought experiment. He sets out to write a "shiny new code," reserv­
ing the right to take "some license with decided cases" (p. 199). "In my 
dreamworld, I would write on a clean slate, faithful only to a reason­
able reading of basic constitutional tenets and to some personal no­
tions of efficiency and fairness" (p. 199). The result is a proposed 
overhaul of the law of confessions and search and seizure. This Part 
will focus on Uviller's most ambitious suggestions to drastically revise 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment exclusionary rules, and ex­
plain how it is unclear that either prosecution or defense would benefit 
from his proffered alternatives. 
A. Confessions 
When it comes to rewriting the policies governing police interroga­
tion, Uviller is anything but timid. The Miranda46 rules warning a sus­
pect of his right to remain silent may have been effective initially (a 
point which Uviller does not concede47), "[b]ut today, the Miranda rit­
ual is a meaningless little joke having virtually no curative or prophy­
lactic effect on the initial condition that prompted it, oppressive and 
coercive inquisition." 48 Accordingly, Uviller would: 
throw out the Miranda rules requiring an incantation of "rights" to exor­
cise the coercive atmosphere of "custodial interrogation," and along with 
it the affiliated doctrine based on the Sixth Amendment that a suspect is 
entitled to the "assistance" of counsel at lineups and interrogation after 
some mystical point in the process known as "formal accusation" has 
passed. [p. 200] · 
· 
Instead, Uviller would construct the following rules. Immediately 
upon capture, but prior to arrest, uncounseled "conversations" -
"uninhibited by any artificial advice concerning the 'right to silence,' 
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
47. P. 200. "The effect of the famous advisory will always be unknowable (despite the 
serious efforts of several scholars to figure out whether the litany actually deters confessions, 
and if so with what effect on convictions)." Miranda "probably had a good effect indirectly 
on interrogation procedure, keeping the cops mindful of the fact that a court was looking 
over their shoulders." Id. But, "[i]t also probably had a bad effect insofar as it taught cops 
that a little white lie in the right place could save the case, otherwise doomed by a tardy or 
incomplete warning." Pp. 200-01. 
48. P. 201. There is no shortage of commentators who would disagree with Uviller on 
this point. See generally Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession 
Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001). 
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' right to counsel,' and all that" - would be permitted, but only during 
the "natural exchange attendant on the initial encounter or the unpro­
voked initiative of the defendant himself" (p. 201 ) .  Limited only by 
the requirement that these conversations be conducted free of "true 
coercion," (defined as "physical force or the threat of it") ,  the police 
may freely question the suspect (p. 201 ) .  · ' · 
Already Uviller's plan begs an obvious question: What constitutes 
a "natural exchange" between police and suspect? Uviller recognizes 
the potential difficulty of answering this question in light of the multi­
ple factual scenarios in which police apprehend suspects, but he is un­
fazed. "Hard as they may be for thee and me, these are just the sort of 
questions trial judges are accustomed to answering" (p. 201). Granted, 
one of the principal objections to Miranda is that it fails to address the 
problem of the "swearing contest" between police and defendant in 
court.49 But Uviller's scheme, thus far conceived, would seem to only 
substitute a "swearing contest" about one set of events (whether 
Miranda rights were properly administered) for another (whether the 
questioning occurred during the initial "natural exchange"). At least 
in this respect, Uviller's inquiry offers less protection against police 
deception than other reform proposals, such as calls to videotape po­
lice interrogation.50 
In exchange for disallowing any police questioning after the initial 
"natural exchange," Uviller would substitute "intensive interrogation 
by the examining magistrate at arraignment when the case first gets to 
court" (p. 201). The accused would be represented by counsel at this 
inquiry, and would be free to decline to answer any questions from the 
bench. Should he choose to do so, however, "the judge may draw -
and allow the jury who eventually hears the case to draw - the ap­
propriate inference · from the choice of silence ·under the circum­
stances" (pp. 201-02). Such a scheme "goes considerably further than 
the foolish Miranda charade to protect against hidden, subtly coercive 
probes of the isolated suspect's mind. At the same time, it allows fair 
access to the mind of the person who is most likely to know something 
49. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The [Miranda] rules 
do not serve due process interests in preventing blatant coercion since . . .  they do nothing to 
contain the policeman who is prepared to lie from the start."); see also Richard A. Leo, The 
Impact a/Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681 (1996) ("Miranda has 
altogether failed to resolve a number of problems that continue to bedevil the constitutional 
law of criminal procedure," including "the problem of adjudicating the 'swearing contest' 
between officer and suspect in court."). · 
50. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Per­
spective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1130 
(1998) ("Videotaping would better protect •against police brutality, end the 'swearing con­
test' about what happened in secret custodial interrogation, and allow suspects who are ma­
nipulated into falsely confessing to prove their innocence."). 
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about the events at issue - or at least about his own removal from 
them."51 
At first glance, it may appear that Uviller's proposals would be a 
boon to law enforcement. Such an inference is not completely unwar­
ranted, as Miranda's detractors typically oppose the rules on the 
ground that they impair police efforts to solve crime.52 But initial ap­
pearances may be deceiving. Uviller quite reasonably anticipates that 
law enforcement would oppose his scheme, as proscribing all police 
questioning beyond their initial encounter with the suspect would in­
evitably result in the loss of confessions. Uviller does not doubt that 
skilled police interrogators, alone with a suspect, "can convert a confi­
dent denial into a detailed confession in a matter of hours" (p. 206). 
The problem, as Uviller sees it, is that too many confessions are ob­
tained via questionable methods. "In the lengthy, unsupervised, unre­
corded interaction of cops and suspects confined on police turf, free 
choice becomes a murky element" (p. 206). In the end, "though valid 
confessions would surely be lost, a dark corner of sequestered police 
practice would be closed. And that is good for public faith, I think" (p. 
206). 
Uviller's plan is arguably more favorable to criminal defendants 
than Miranda in another significant respect as well. Under Harris v. 
New York,53 the "fruits" of Miranda violations may be used for im­
peachment purposes, a decision that has drawn harsh criticism.5 4 
Uviller, on the other hand, would disallow such practices: "Nor should 
confessions that were obtained in· delayed or protracted police inter­
rogation be introduced in evidence or their indirect leads used" (pp. 
210-11). Again, Uviller does not deny that his scheme, certain to "pro­
duce a sizable increase in excluded evidence of autoinculpation," 
would make it more difficult to convict criminals (p. 211). 
Uviller sees his model as a compromise, a more equitable balance 
between competing interests. Defendants will no longer receive 
Miranda warnings, but nor will they be subject to extended police 
questioning, as all interrogation will be conducted by a magistrate in 
51 .  Pp. 202-03. Uviller, recognizing the obvious counterarguments to his proposal, notes 
that allowing a judge and jury to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's guilt would re­
quire: first, overruling Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid "either comment by the prosecution on the accused's 
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt"); and second, re­
turning to an original understanding of the Fifth Amendment's right to silence as guaran­
teeing freedom from torture, but not immunity from inquiry (at pp. 203-05, Uviller cites as 
support for this proposition Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspec­
tive: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L REV. 2625 (1996)). 
52. See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, supra note 50. 
53. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
54. The Court's decision in Harris has been described as "the first blow the Burger 
Court struck Miranda ." Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule " Miranda?, 85 
CORNELL L REV. 883, 951 n.373 (2000). 
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the open environs of a courtroom, with the assistance of counsel. On 
the other hand, defendants lose their right to remain silent without 
consequence, as both judge and jury would be allowed to infer guilt 
from the suspect's refusal to answer a magistrate's questions. In sum, 
with something to offer both sides, as well as something taken away, 
Uviller's plan is unlikely to be warmly received by either civil liber­
tarians or law enforcement. 
B. · Search & Seizure 
Above all, Uviller wants to read the warrant requirement back into 
the Fourth Amendment: "I would retain all instruction to the ground 
troops on the simplest, core essence of the provision: make your intru­
sions only by warrant bearing the sanction of the court" (p. 207). That 
said, to ensure that warrants become "normal, ordinary protocol of 
search," Uviller would employ technology to aid the process by which 
they are obtained (p. 207). For instance, " [ e ) lectronics today accord 
the means by which warrants can be instantly issued on the radio­
transmitted, sworn allegations of the field officer" (p. 208). Uviller 
emphasizes, however, that simplifying the. process does not mean that 
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would be exempt from chal­
lenge (as is largely the case at present), nor weaken the protection af­
forded by the warrant requirement. Warrants could be challenged if 
"issued on false allegations or inadequate grounds, or if they con­
tained vague specifications of the place to be searched and the things 
to be seized," and evidence would be excluded if "gained in the course 
of abusive or needlessly destructive execution" (p. 208). 
Evidence seized in the absence of a warrant, however, would be 
subject to discretionary exclusion, rather th.an the current standard of 
automatic exclusion. In each case, the judge would ask: "in all the par­
ticular circumstances of this acquisition, are the interests of justice ad­
vanced more by admission or exclusion?" (p. 209). In answering this 
question, judges would be guided by five considerations "central to the 
idea of a 'reasonable' search."55 Such a system, by implementing an ad 
hoc process, admittedly would "weaken the prescriptive virtues of the 
exclusionary rule" (p. 209). Uviller's response is to point out the 
weaknesses of the current standard, a warrant requirement with so 
many exceptions that it is practically toothless. 
55. P. 209. These five factors are: 
(1) the gravity of the matter under investigation; 
(2) the depth or destructiveness of the search; 
(3) the importance of the evidence sought in light of other evidence available; 
( 4) the availability of less intrusive means to acquire it; 
(5) the degree of privacy that should be accorded the person, place, or container searched or 
the property interests infringed by its seizure. 
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As with his plan to rewrite confession law, the key feature of 
Uviller's model is increased judicial discretion. He is "basically in­
clined to celebrate discretion as the mark of a mature and responsible 
system" (p. 214). As a general matter, "[s]ince faith must be lodged 
somewhere in an open system of justice, I choose (with appropriate 
misgivings) to trust judges" (p. 214). On an individual level, "[m]ost of 
the judges I have met consider it important, terribly important, to be 
cautious, conscientious, and objective" (p. 214). Be that as it may, 
Uviller does not address the fact that the vast majority of judges in this 
country are popularly elected, and thus particularly sensitive to politi­
cal pressure.56 Accordingly, as Professor Welsh White argues: 
If the exclusionary rule is mandatory, the conscientious judge will be able 
to say he had no choice: the law required him to exclude the evidence. If 
the exclusionary rule is discretionary, however, the judge cannot make 
this statement. . . .  From the public's point of view, the judge who exer­
cises his discretion to exclude evidence is choosing to make it more diffi­
cult to convict an accused criminal. Because a judge will not want to be 
perceived as impeding effective law enforcement, he will generally exer­
cise his discretion to admit the evidence.57 
Under Uviller's standard, tµis concern seems particularly relevant. If, 
in each case, the judge must ask herself, "Are the interests of justice 
advanced more by admission or exclusion?", one may posit that even 
the most honorable jurist would be strongly tempted toward admis­
sion, especially if the crime is brutal, the victim is young, or public sen­
timent is otherwise particularly aroused. To be sure, a principled ar­
gument may be made in favor of alternatives to the current mandatory 
fourth amendment exclm;ionary rule,5 8 but Uviller largely declines to 
make it. Instead, he simply deposits his confidence in judges and opti­
mistically leaves them free to do the right thing. 
56. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725 (1995) (noting that in only twelve states are judges not 
electorally accountable). Uviller only briefly addresses how American judges are selected, 
and then to make a separate point: 
Lest I be called naive, I would add that my inclination toward discretion spurs urgent atten­
tion to the processes of appointment ·and removal of those empowered. Improvement in the 
woeful American political appointment process, however, will not come from reducing the 
scope of judicial license but, paradoxically, from increasing it. As we recognize the scope of 
discretion with which we empower our judges, perhaps we will strive more earnestly to select 
the best qualified for the role. We'will eventually come to realize (as the British have) that 
people should not be thus empowered by virtue of party service, or racial, sexual, or ethnic 
fit. 
P. 214. 
57. Welsh S. White, Improving Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1645, 1677 (1995) (reviewing CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993)). 
58. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1 .2( c ), at 35 n.53 (providing an overview of scholarship 
offering alternatives to the exclusionary rule). 
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Again, as with Uviller's confession model, an initial assessment 
may indicate that these reform efforts would have a disproportfonately 
adverse effect on defendants. But first appearances may likewise be 
deceiving in this context, as Uviller persuasively demonstrates the 
benefits to the accused under his plan. Evidence obtained from 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant would not be presumptively 
admissible, as is the case presently. First, Uviller "would bar the har­
vest of a search by warrant unsupported by probable cause or lacking 
a particular description of the mission" (p. 211). Second, Uviller would 
abolish the so-called "good faith exception" recognized in United 
States v. Leon,59 where the Court held that "the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule should be modified so as to not bar the use in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in 
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neu­
tral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable 
cause."60 Jettisoning the good faith exception, a move supported by 
multiple commentators,61 would unquestionably aid defendants more 
than prosecutors. 
As for warrantless searches, Uviller hopes they will become a rar­
ity, "exceptions rather than the common practice" (p. 211). Should 
they occur, however, automatic exclusion is replaced by discretionary 
exclusion, a substitution which Uviller admits will mean that "illegally 
seized evidence would be admitted in some cases where, today, it 
would be excluded" (p. 211). Is this unfair? Uviller thinks not. The in­
terests of fairness would be served in many ways; juries would receive 
more complete factual information, which would promote truth in 
verdicts, which would increase the public's respect for the law. Finally, 
ad hoc judicial discretion "is fair because it cuts through what appears 
(not without reason) to be a senseless morass of 'technicalities' in the 
law of search and seizure" (p. 211). 
* * * * * 
Uviller's revision of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment ex­
clusionary rules is a serious departure from his defense of the status 
quo in so many other areas of criminal procedure. He acknowledges 
his "radical redesign" of these major tenets, but believes the changes 
are necessary. "I conclude that when it comes to full and vigorous 
prosecutorial pursuit at trial, our system is not performing as it 
should" (p. 290). More importantly, he believes that his reforms are 
fair. "I do not think I cut back on any vital values when I argue that 
59. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
60. Id. at 900. 
61. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § l .3(a), at 52 n.5 (compiling examples). 
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fairness demands greater access to probative evidence and a better 
chance that all verdicts will be based on a more complete picture" (p. 
290). 
Ultimately, however, it would appear that Uviller's prescriptions 
would be inadequate to cure the ills he identifies with the current ex­
clusionary rules. "Cops are always in ·need of instruction, granted. 
They need to know, if nothing else, that someone is watching. But just 
how much instruction they actually receive from the courts today is 
questionable. Too many courts, too many finely wrought opinions, too 
many thinly sliced situations, major transmission problems" (p. 290). 
Uviller's code is therefore ostensibly founded on the need to provide 
better guidance to law enforcement, to produce a "document where 
any fool could go and look up what is legal and what is not" (p. 198). 
It is not at all obvious, however, that a discretionary exclusionary 
rule would bring greater clarity to police officers' decisionmaking pro­
cess. The Court's decision in Miranda, it should be remembered, was 
premised on similar aspirations of providing guidance.62 But consider, 
for example, the incentives generated by Uviller's confession model. 
When police detain a suspect, aware that he may be questioned only 
until the moment of arrest (at which point all interrogation must cease 
until arraignment), their instinct will presumably be to stretch the 
"natural exchange attendant on the initial encounter" to its broadest 
limits. Courts will inevitably be forced to determine the scope of what 
is "natural." Only that communication which occurs within the first 
one minute of capturing the suspect? Five minutes? During the car 
ride to the stationhouse? Even conceding to Uviller the institutional 
competence of trial judges to make these determinations,63 before too 
long the state and federal reporters will be replete with varying inter­
pretations as to what · constitutes a natural exchange, undermining the 
instructional value of Uviller's simple code. 
Similar problems arise with Uviller's search and seizure model. He 
"protest( s] that today we have only the illusion of a set of rules by 
which future police conduct can be guided" (p. 209). "Courts divide, 
and every case is different. Even the illusion of settled directives is dif­
ficult to maintain. So little is lost" (p. 209). More important, however, 
is to ask: What is gained? According to Uviller, no longer would 
courts "depend for guidance on only the crudest inferences from past 
adjudication;" in this context, a mass of confusing and contradictory 
precedent (pp. 209-10). The admission of evidence obtained from war­
rantless searches would instead turn on the "demands of justice in 
62. See Dickerson v. United States, U.S. Reporter (2000) (noting that "The Miranda 
opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari . . . 'to give concrete consti­
tutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' ") (quoting Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 441-42). 
63. See text accompanying supra notes 56-58. 
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each particular case" (p. 209). This may be an acceptable standard for 
judges to apply when deciding motions to suppress evidence, but it 
would seem to provide little assistance to police at the crucial moment 
when contemplating to search or seize in the absence of a magistrate's 
advance approval. When a case is being investigated, the "demands of 
justice" are far less apparent than when it is being tried. Officers who 
legitimately believe that evidence will be lost or destroyed in the time 
necessary to obtain a warrant (even an electronic one) would be 
forced to make decisions based on uncertain predictions about 
whether a judge will later deem their actions reasonable according to 
factors they cannot presently anticipate. (Such as, for example, "the 
availability of less intrusive means to acquire it" (p. 209).) As unruly 
as modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may be, 64 it would ap­
pear to be at least marginally more instructive than Uviller's multi­
factored, ad hoc inquiry. In sum, Uviller's plans to rewrite the exclu­
sionary rules, while ambitious, seem more to displace problems than 
to solve them. 
CONCLUSION 
Uviller believes the American criminal justice system, while far 
from perfect, is "tolerably fair." Whether readers will agree with him 
is likely to be dictated by the nature of their participation in the proc­
ess,65 and thus their baseline instincts about where the distribution of 
advantages should ultimately rest. Uviller does not deny the inherent 
subjectivity of this analysis, nor does he claim to have arrived at any 
universal definition of fairness: 
Law in both substance and process is, after all, an expression of what we 
think is right, a collection of aspirational conventions. It is surprisingly 
difficult, however, to tease them out of the tightly woven fabric of com­
mon experience and invisible assumption. And if and when any intrepid 
soul undertakes to expose and describe these essential strands, there is 
bound to be disagreement, mocking any claim to universal accord. [p. 
280] 
What we are left with, then, are the opinions of one (albeit influen­
tial) law professor and former prosecutor. His conclusions about fair­
ness will undoubtedly differ from those of the parents of a murdered 
child, the inmate serving a life sentence for a third strike conviction of 
64. P. 210. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur­
ring) ("Even before today's decision, the [Fourth Amendment) 'warrant requirement' had 
become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable."). 
65. P. 17 ("[W)hat you consider the appropriate balance of forces may depend, in large 
measure, on whether you view the question from the perspective of the innocent accused, 
the guilty accused, the persuaded prosecutor, or whether you (like me) still insist that the 
primary function of a criminal trial is to separate the guilty from the innocent with some few 
overarching public values."). 
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felony theft of a bicycle, the law enforcement officials who must trav­
erse the often ambiguous line between zealously fighting crime and re­
specting civil liberties, or the citizens who simply want to feel safe in 
their neighborhoods. 
This diversity of available perspectives underscores the difficulty of 
ascertaining any shared standard of fairness. But just because the task 
is difficult does not mean the effort should be avoided. For that rea­
son, The Tilted Playing Field is most appropriately interpreted as a 
valuable statement in the ongoing dialogue about fairness and criminal 
justice. 
